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Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between short-term interest rates and 
bank risk. Using a unique database that includes quarterly balance sheet information for 
listed banks operating in the European Union and the United States in the last decade, 
we find evidence that unusually low interest rates over an extended period of time 
contributed to an increase in banks' risk. This result holds for a wide range of measures 
of risk, as well as macroeconomic and institutional controls. 
Keywords: bank risk, monetary policy, credit crisis. 
JEL classification: E44, E55, G21. 
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Unusually low levels of the short-term interest rates have often been named as one of the factors 
contributing to recent banking problems. While it is hard to assume that monetary policy was the 
main cause of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, a period of what - with the benefit of hindsight - can 
be seen as characterized by overly low interest rates may, in some cases, have contributed to its 
build up. Against this background this paper analyzes the link between monetary policy actions 
and bank risk-taking for listed banks in sixteen developed countries.  
In the aftermath of the burst of the dotcom bubble, many central banks lowered interest 
rates to ward off recession. It was, at the time, believed that those monetary policy levels would 
be indeed consistent with inflation targeting objectives. The implications of monetary policy for 
financial imbalances and financial stability were generally deemed of minor importance, not least 
because ongoing financial innovation was seen as strengthening the resilience of the financial 
system by contributing to a more efficient sharing of risk.  
However, excess liquidity created by loose monetary policy may have encouraged banks 
to increase their actual risk positions in at least two ways. First, low interest rates affect 
valuations, incomes and cash flows, which in turn can modify how banks measure estimated 
risks. Second, low returns on investments, such as government (risk-free) securities, coupled with 
the lower cost of obtaining new debt for borrowers may increase incentives for investors 
(including banks) and borrowers to take on more risk. These incentives can be due to behavioral, 
contractual or institutional reasons, for example to meet a target nominal rate of return or 
misperceptions about the actual risk undertaken. It is also likely that the closer relationship 
between bank funding needs and financial markets conditions have enhanced the impact of 
monetary policy changes on banks’ risk positions. In this respect, it is likely that credit 
intermediaries have probably shorten their investment horizons as they obtain a larger percentage 
of their profits linked to financial market activities, such as proprietary trading and investment 
banking activities which are more dependent on market signals including the monetary policy 
rate. 
Using a comprehensive database of quarterly balance sheet information and risk 
measures for listed banks operating in the European Union and the United States in the last 
decade, we analyze the link between unusually low interest rates over an extended period of time 
and bank risk. In order to disentangle the effects of monetary policy from other factors, we have 
to delve into other possible causes of changes in banks' risk. Hence we also account for bank-
specific characteristics (size, liquidity, capitalization, lending portfolios, profitability), 
macroeconomic factors (GDP, housing and equity prices, structure of the yield curve), and 
institutional characteristics at the national level (competition, risk appetite and intensity of 
regulation).  
Our main result is that, even controlling for the above factors, low levels of short-term 
interest rates over an extended period of time contributed to an increase in bank risk. This is of 
interest to both monetary and supervisory authorities and has, to our mind, two major 
implications. First, it suggests that central banks would need to consider the possible effects of 
monetary policy actions on bank risk. The potential impact of risk-taking by banks may have 
implications for longer term macroeconomic outlook including output growth, investment and 
credit. Second, banking supervisors should strengthened the macro-prudential perspective to 
financial stability by intensifying their vigilance during periods of protracted low interest rates, 
particularly if accompanied by other signs of risk-taking, such as rapid credit and asset price 
increases. 6
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“John Bull can stand many things but can not stand two percent” (Walter Bagehot, 1873).  
I
In the aftermath of the burst of the dotcom bubble, many central banks lowered interest 
rates to ward off recession. Prior successes in taming higher levels of inflation 
strengthened the support for a large number of monetary authorities to lower interest 
rates, keeping them below the levels suggested by historical experience (Taylor, 2009). 
While excessive liquidity could encourage bank risk-taking, this financial stability 
aspect was not seen as particularly threatening for two main reasons. First, most central 
banks around the world have progressively shifted towards tight inflation objectives as 
their best contribution to fostering economic growth (Svensson and Woodford, 2004). 
Second, financial innovation had, for the most part, been regarded as a factor that would 
strengthen the resilience of the financial system by resulting in a more efficient 
allocation of risks (Greenspan, 2005). In this context, the financial stability implications 
of monetary policy actions were deemed of minor importance.  
Although it is difficult to state that monetary policy has been the main cause of 
the current crisis, it could have contributed to its build-up. There are two main ways in 
which low interest rates may influence bank risk-taking. First, low interest rates affect 
valuations, incomes and cash flows, which in turn can influence how banks measure 
risk (Adrian and Shin, 2009a; 2009b; Borio and Zhu, 2008). Second, low returns on 
investments, such as government (risk-free) securities, may increase incentives for 
banks, asset managers and insurance companies to take on more risk for behavioral, 
contractual or institutional reasons, for example to meet a nominal return target 
(Brunnermeier, 2001; Rajan, 2005).  
In this paper we analyze empirically the relationship between monetary policy and 
risk-taking by banks. Using a unique database of quarterly balance sheet information 
and risk measures for listed banks operating in the European Union and the United 
States in the last decade, we find evidence that unusually low interest rates over an 
extended period of time contributed to an increase in banks’ risk-taking. The paper is 
innovative and relevant in two respects: first, it analyzes the effectiveness of the risk-
taking channel at the international level using a wide range of publicly available 
indicators for bank risk; second, it relies on an in-depth analysis of the possible 
determinants of banks’ risk prior and during the financial turmoil. In order to 
INTRODUCTION7
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disentangle the effects of monetary policy from other factors, we have to delve into 
other possible causes of changes in banks’ risk. Hence we also account for bank-
specific characteristics (size, liquidity, capitalization, lending portfolios, profitability), 
macroeconomic factors (GDP, housing and equity prices, structure of the yield curve), 
and institutional characteristics at the national level (competition, risk appetite, intensity 
of regulation). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
how monetary policy can have an impact on banks’ risk-taking. Section III describes the 
data used in the analysis, while Section IV presents the econometric model and main 
results. Section V verifies the robustness of the findings considering: i) a more complete 
term structure for bank risk; ii) non-linear models including explicitly business 
expectations, differences in the levels of bank regulation and competition; iii) a model 
that evaluates the probability for a bank to belong to the last quartile of the riskier banks  
during the crisis. The last section summarizes the main conclusions. 
II. MONETARY POLICY AND RISK-TAKING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
From a historical perspective, easy monetary conditions are a classical ingredient in 
boom-bust type business fluctuations (Fisher, 1933; Hayek, 1939; Kindleberger, 1978). 
Low interest rates could indeed induce financial imbalances by means of a reduction in 
risk aversion of banks and other investors. This part of the monetary transmission 
mechanism has been recently referred to as the risk-taking channel and relates to how 
changes in monetary policy rates affect either risk perceptions or risk-tolerance (Borio 
and Zhu, 2008). 
There are a number of ways in which low interest rates can influence bank risk-
taking. The first is through their impact on valuations, incomes and cash flows and 
measured risk.
1 A reduction in the policy rate boosts asset and collateral values, which 
in turn can modify banks’ estimates of probabilities of default, loss given default and 
volatilities. For example, low interest rates by boosting asset prices tend to reduce asset 
                                                           
1 This is close in spirit to the familiar financial accelerator, in which increases in collateral values reduce 
borrowing constraints (Bernanke et al, 1996). Adrian and Shin (2009b) claim that the risk-taking channel 
is distinct but complementary to the financial accelerator because it focuses on amplification mechanisms 
due to financing frictions in the lending sector. Fostel and Geanakoplos (2009) link the leverage cycle 
with contagion.  8
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price volatility and thus measured risk: since a higher stock price increases the value of 
equity relative to corporate debt, a sharp increase in stock prices reduce corporate 
leverage and could thus decrease the risk of holding stocks.  This example can be 
applied to the widespread use of Value-at-Risk methodologies for economic and 
regulatory capital purposes (Danielsson et al (2004)). As volatility tends to decline in 
rising markets, it releases risk budgets of financial firms and encourages position-
taking. A similar argument is provided by Adrian and Shin (2009b) who stress that 
changes in measured risk determine adjustments in bank balance sheets and leverage 
conditions and this, in turn, amplifies business cycle movements.
3  
The second way the risk-taking channel may operate is through the ‘search for 
yield’ (Rajan, 2005). Low interest rates may increase incentives for asset managers to 
take on more risks for a number of factors. Some are psychological or behavioral in 
nature such as the so- called money illusion: investors may ignore the fact that nominal 
interest rates may decline to compensate for lower inflation. Others may reflect 
institutional or regulatory constraints. For example, life insurance companies and 
pension funds typically manage their assets with reference to their liabilities. In some 
countries, liabilities are linked to a minimum guaranteed nominal rate of return or 
returns reflecting long-term actuarial assumptions rather than the current level of yields. 
In a period of declining interest rates, they may exceed the yields available on highly-
rated government bonds. The resulting gap can lead institutions to invest in higher-
yielding, higher-risk instruments. More generally, financial institutions regularly enter 
into long-term contracts committing them to produce relatively high nominal rates of 
return. And a similar mechanism could be in place whenever private investors use short-
term returns as a way of judging manager competence and withdraw funds after poor 
performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004). More 
broadly, the link between low interest rates and excessive risk-taking is also influenced 
by competition, the structure of managerial bonus schemes and deficiencies in 
                                                           
3 Lower interest rates may reduce the incentives to screen borrowers, thereby effectively encouraging 
banks to relax their credit standards. From a modeling perspective, this mechanism is equivalent to the 
impact of increased competition on lending standards (Ruckes, 2004; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). 9
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supervision and regulation (Ackerman et al., 1999; Salas and Saurina, 2003; 
Kouwenberg and Ziemba, 2007). 
A third possible set of effects of monetary policy on risk-taking may operate 
through habit formation. In their work on the equity risk premium, Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999) show that investors become less risk-averse during economic 
expansions because their consumption increases relative to normal levels. An easing of 
monetary policy may, by increasing real economic activity, decrease the degree of 
investors’ risk aversion. This mechanism is in line with the findings from literature on 
asset-pricing models, which predict higher credit spreads in the long run after periods of 
lower interest rates (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Dufresne et al., 2001). 
Finally, risk-taking may also be influenced by the communication policies of a 
central bank and the characteristics of policymakers’ reaction functions. For example, a 
high degree of central bank predictability with regard to future policy decisions can 
reduce market uncertainty and thus lead banks to take on more risks. In this way agents’ 
perception that the central bank will ease monetary policy in the event of bad economic 
outcomes could lower the probability of large downside risks, thereby producing an 
insurance effect. This is a typical moral hazard problem. For this reason, Diamond and 
Rajan (2009) argue that in good times monetary policy should be kept tighter than 
strictly necessary based on current economic conditions, in order to diminish banks’ 
incentive to take on liquidity risk. In a forward looking manner agents can also choose 
to increase their interest rate exposure to macroeconomic conditions making monetary 
policy time inconsistent not because of an inflation bias in the preference of policy 
makers but rather to the higher macroeconomic sensitivity to interest rates (Farhi and 
Tirole, 2009). 
Turning to the empirical evidence, there are only a handful of studies that try to 
test directly for the existence of a risk-taking channel. The paper by Jiménez et al 
(2009) uses micro data of the Spanish Credit Register over the period 1984–2006 to 
investigate whether the stance of monetary policy has an impact on the level of risk of 
individual bank loans. They find that low interest rates affect the risk of the loan 
portfolio of Spanish banks in two conflicting ways. In the short term, low interest rates 
reduce the probability of default of the outstanding variable rate loans, by reducing 
interest burdens of previous borrowers. In the medium term, however, due to higher 10
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collateral values and the search for yield, banks tend to grant more risky loans and, in 
general, to soften their lending standards: they lend more to borrowers with a bad credit 
history and with more uncertain prospects. 
Ioannidou et al (2009) take a different, perspective and analyze whether the risk-
taking channel works not only on the quantity of new loans but also on their interest 
rates. The authors investigate the impact of changes in interest rates on loan pricing 
using Bolivian data over the period 1999–2003. They find that, when interest rates are 
low, not only do banks increase the number of new risky loans but they also reduce the 
rates they charge to riskier borrowers relative to what they charge to less risky ones. 
Interestingly, the reduction in the corresponding spread (and the extra risk) is higher for 
banks with lower capital ratios and more bad loans. Data on individual loan and 
borrower characteristics is however confidential in most occasions and available only 
for a handful of countries who maintain a credit register.  
Our approach is complementary. We take an international perspective and focus 
on the banking sector by relying on publicly available information to most central banks 
and supervisors. We use an extensive and unique database which matches balance sheet 
data at a quarterly frequency for listed banks in the European Union and US with an 
array of individual proxies of bank risk. In order to insulate the effects of monetary 
policy we control for a wide set of alternative factors that could impact on risk-taking 
attitude including bank-specific characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, differences 
in the intensity of bank supervision, investors' risk aversion, changes in bank 
competition perception, the housing price boom-bust cycle and excessive lending 
growth. 
III. DATA
The sample comprises quarterly balance sheet information taken from Bloomberg over 
the period 1998-2008. Unlike the overwhelming majority of international banking 
studies which employ annual data, this research uses quarterly data which are more 
appropriate for measuring the short-term impact of monetary policy changes on bank 
risk. The initial sample includes information from an unbalanced panel of more than 
1,100 listed banks from 16 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 11
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possible in accounting standards, we included only listed banks (which are usually very 
large and often cross-listed in several stock exchanges) and focused on standard 
indicators (i.e. balance sheet size, capital to asset ratio, liquidity ratio, total lending, 
return on assets). 
The variable accounting for bank risk is an important element of the analysis. 
Hence, the data on individual bank financial statements have been matched with a wide 
array of publicly available and widely used measures accounting for bank risk.  
The first one is given by the expected default frequency (EDF).  EDF is the 
probability that a company will default within a given time horizon (typically one 
year).
4 EDF is a well-known, forward-looking indicator of credit risk, computed by 
Moody’s KMV, which builds on Merton’s model to price corporate bond debt (Merton, 
1974).
5 The EDF value, expressed as a percentage, is calculated combining banks’ 
financial statements with stock market information and a default database.  
EDF figures are regularly used by financial institutions, investors, central banks 
and regulators to monitor the health of the financial system (IMF, 2009a; ECB, 2009). 
The evolution of the one-year EDF for the countries in the sample is reported in Chart 
1. 
Even if EDFs have done quite well as a predictor of default during the recent 
credit crisis with respect to other measures (see, for instance, Munves et al., 2009), 
Chart 1 shows that risk had probably been underpriced in the pre-crisis period.
6 This 
means that prior to the crisis banks were taking risks which were not fully accounted for 
by financial market indicators at the time. Indeed, one key element of the risk-taking 
channel works through the impact of interest rates on measured risk. This implies that 
the risk was not fully apparent at the time the loans or other activities were made. The 
panel approach undertaken in this study allows us to solve, at least in part, this problem 
                                                           
4 “Default” refers to the failure to make a scheduled debt payment. 
5 More specifically the calculation of EDF builds on Vasicek and Kealhofer’s extension of the Black-
Scholes-Merton option-pricing framework to make it suitable for practical analysis and on the proprietary 
default database owned by KMV (Dwyer and Qu, 2007). For an empirical application of EDFs see, for 
instance, Garlappi et al. (2007). 
6 This bias is likely to be smaller than in the case of other indicators of bank risk (such as bond spreads) 
as  EDF includes both leverage and volatility which tends to grow also in periods prior to banking 
problems. 12
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by analyzing not only the time dimension but also the cross section dimension among 
banks. By means of the latter we are able to analyze relative changes in bank risk-
attitude (i.e. comparing risky versus less risky banks as perceived by the market) and 
link these changes to monetary policy even in a period of subdued risk perception. In 
addition, the use of microeconomic data allows us to rule out the assumption that the 
increase in banks’ EDFs during the crisis period is simply caused by the realization of a 
negative systemic shock and to control for the impact on risk-taking of bank-specific 
characteristics. 
In general the identification strategy used in this paper is the following: since 
monetary policy conditions are different across countries, the hypothesis of the risk-
taking channel would suggest that bank risk (EDF) increases by more in those countries 
where the level of interest rate has been relatively low (below both the Taylor rule and 
the natural rate reflecting national economic conditions). Given that the main estimation 
specifications (see Section IV) involve only one quarter lag between the monetary 
policy indicators and the EDFs, we have also extended our analysis studying the 
probability of being a risky bank during the crisis conditional of a number of pre-crisis 
factors (see Subsection V.III). 
As further robustness checks, the analysis of EDF is supplemented by including 
additional measures to account for bank risk derived from stock market information. 
The objective is to decompose bank risk into two measures accounting for idiosyncratic 
(individual) and systemic (market wide) elements. Thus we can ascertain whether 
monetary policy influences each individual bank’s risk position on top of systemic 
considerations. More specifically this helps clarify bank attitudes towards risk-taking, 
independent of the developments in the banking system as a whole, which might be due 
to shocks common to all financial intermediaries. To tackle this, two complementary 
approaches have been used. The first is based on a simple Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). This allows for the calculation of specific beta coefficients for each bank in 
the sample for each specific quarter, using daily data. The idiosyncratic component is 
then simply given by the unexplained component of each regression for bank i over 
each quarter t (IDSC1).
7 The second approach follows Campbell et al. (2001), who 
                                                           
7 The CAPM model is based on the following equation: Ri,k,t= βi,t+ Rm,k,t +İi,t  where Ri,k,t and Rm,k,t are the 
individual bank i and market wide m logarithmic returns calculated for each country k at quarter t. The 
 13
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build on Merton (1980) and decompose historical stock market movements into total 
market, banking sector and individual bank level volatility. As in Campbell et al. 
(2001), the latter is interpreted as the idiosyncratic risk of each individual bank for each 
given quarter (IDSC2).
8 The top left hand side of Table 1 shows the correlation between 
the different measures of bank risk used in this paper. The correlation is always positive 
and significant, but in many cases is significantly less than one.  
  Turning to the macroeconomic variables, the monetary policy rate is the three-
month interbank rate. This measure, unlike the interest rate on main refinancing 
operations, is able to capture the effect of the recent credit crisis on the actual cost of 
bank refinancing.
9 The seasonally adjusted nominal GDP was obtained from the OECD 
Economic Outlook database, while
 Datastream is the source of stock market returns and 
interest rates. The slope of the yield curve is calculated as the difference between the 
ten-year government bond yields and the short term rate. Housing index nominal returns 
have been obtained from the Bank for International Settlements. 
  The initial sample consisted of more than 1,100 banks in 16 industrialized 
countries. Unfortunately, not all of the bank risk measures used in the study were 
available for all of these banks so it was decided to restrict the analysis to the 643 banks 
for which all the necessary information was available. Table 2 gives some basic 
information on the final dataset. From a macroeconomic point of view, this dataset is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
term İi,t is the bank specific residual. We use bank-level return data at daily frequency, including all 
traded banks represented in the Datastream broad banking index for each country. We included banks 
which were traded at one point during our period of study (for instance, so-called ‘dead’ banks resulting 
from acquisitions are also included). The broad Datastream indices are used as they are comparable 
across countries and have a very wide coverage. For the sake of simplicity, we follow Campbell et al. 
(2001) and assume that the zero-intercept assumption is reasonable in this context. We also rerun all 
calculations including a bank specific intercept with no changes in the main results. All estimations are 
available upon request. 
8 Campbell et al. (2001) calculate the decomposition of stock market volatility without imposing a 
parametric model to describe its evolution over time. By assuming that the different components (market, 
sector and individual) of stock market returns are orthogonal to one another, a simple variance 
decomposition can be undertaken to calculate each of these components of risk. Therefore individual 











where Ri,t and RB,t are, respectively, the individual bank i and banking sector B returns for each country k 
at time t. The variable obs refers to the number of daily observations for each quarter available for bank i. 
All results are available upon request. 
9 We also tried other measures of monetary policy rates with a lower maturity (overnight, one-month) and 
results remain unchanged. 14
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still extremely relevant because it represents around two-thirds of the total lending 
provided by banks in the European Union and the US. The average size of the banks in 
the sample is the largest in the United Kingdom, Belgium and Sweden, and smallest in 
Finland and Greece. Equally, the average size of US banks is not very large because 
there is more information available for this country and many small banks are also 
listed. The averages of individual bank characteristics differ across countries. There are 
also differences in terms of capital and liquidity ratios, probably reflecting different 
competitive and institutional conditions, as well as different stages of the business 
cycle. 
In Table 3, banks are grouped depending on their specific risk position, using one-
year EDFs. A ‘high-risk’ bank has the average EDF of banks in the fifth quintile (i.e. 
EDFH is equal to 2.02%); a ‘low-risk’ bank has the average EDF of the banks in the 
first quintile (EDFL is equal to 0.09%). The first part of the table shows that high-risk 
banks are smaller, less liquid and less capitalized. The lower degree of liquidity and 
capitalization appears to be consistent with the higher risk of these banks. Additionally, 
low-risk banks make relatively fewer loans than high-risk banks, but the difference is 
not so remarkable. 
IV. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND RESULTS 
Empirically, the main difficulty in measuring the impact of low interest rates on bank 
risk-taking is to separate the effects of changes in monetary policy rates on two key 
areas: first, the risk of outstanding loans and, second, banks’ incentives to take on new 
risk. As already discussed in Section II, a reduction of interest rates causes a positive 
direct effect on lending portfolios (since households and firms pay a reduced interest 
rate on variable rate mortgages, the probability of their going into default declines) 
while a reduction of the interest rate below the benchmark causes a negative effect as 
the ‘search for yield’ gives way to an overall increase in new risk-taking. 
To tackle this identification problem, we have considered both the quarterly 
change in the monetary policy rate and the deviation of the interest rate from a 
benchmark level that evaluates the relative stance of monetary policy. In particular, the 
following country-specific benchmark measures have been calculated: 15
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a)  the difference between the actual nominal short-term interest rate and that 
generated by a ‘Taylor rule’ with interest rate smoothing (TGAP);
10 
b)  the difference between the actual nominal short-term interest rate and that 
generated by a standard “Taylor rule”, using equal weights on output and 
inflation and no interest rate smoothing (TGAP2);
11 
c)  the difference between the real short-term interest rate and the “natural 
interest rate” (NRGAP), calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Chart 2 shows the three measures for the United States. In general, it was found 
that using a Taylor rule of type (a), with interest rate smoothing, tends to reduce the gap 
with respect to the nominal interest rate. This measure is also much less strongly 
correlated with bank EDF than the other measures (-0.10 against -0.20 and -0.18).
12 In 
this paper, TGAP is used as the main measure of relative monetary policy, with the aim 
of applying a more stringent criterion for testing for the existence of a risk-taking 
channel. In other words, since smoothing tends to reduce the magnitude of the channel 
that is being tested, if a risk-taking channel is detected using the TGAP measure, the 
strength of this channel would be expected to be even more significant using a standard 
Taylor rule (TGAP2) or the natural interest rate (NRGAP).  
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10  The Taylor rule suggests a simple way of setting monetary policy (Taylor, 2001). In particular, the 
money market interest rate (i.e. federal funds rate in the US) is a positive function of both the difference 
between inflation (πt) and its target level (π
∗), and the output gap: the gap between GDP (yt) and its long-
term potential non inflationary level (yt
∗). Algebraically, this can be written as it=γ it-1+ (1-γ) [α+βπ (πt - 
π
∗)+ βy (yt - yt
∗)], where γ represents interest rate smoothing and α is the real rate prevailing when output 




*). We set βπ =1.5 and βy =0.5. The interest rate smoothing 
parameter γ has been set to 0.85. The target inflation (π
∗ ) has been set to 2%. 
11  Following the standard set-up for a Taylor rule, we set βπ =βy=0.5 and γ=0. Also in this case the target 
inflation (π
∗) has been set to 2%. 
12 All the three correlations are significantly different from zero at 1% significance level (see the p-values 
in the first column of Table 1). 16
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with i=1,…, N , k= 1, …,15 and  t=1, …, T where N is the number of banks, k is the 
country and T is the final quarter. Table 4 reports the summary statistics for the 
variables used. 
In the baseline equation (1) the quarterly change of the Expected Default 
Frequency (∆EDF) for bank i in quarter t, is regressed on changes in the monetary 
policy indicator (∆MP), the Taylor Rule Gap (TGAP), nominal GDP growth rate 
(∆GDPN), the steepness of the yield curve (SLOPE). Seasonal dummies (SD) have also 
been included in this specification. One lag of all the variables has been introduced in 
order to obtain white noise residuals. 
We relate changes in bank EDFs to country-specific macro-variables because 
intermediation activity, which is the most important part of banks’ business, is done 
principally towards residents. Nevertheless we are aware that a part of bank activities 
takes place on international markets and national conditions could be less important for 
a number of big European banks located in small countries. However, if this were the 
case we should observe a less significant link between changes in individual bank risk 
and low interest rates in the country where the bank is headquartered. In other words, if 
a risk-taking channel is detected using our identification strategy, the strength of this 
channel would be expected to be even more significant when controlling for 
multinational activity. 
The main results of the analysis are reported in Table 5. The introduction of a 
lagged dependent variable among the predictors creates substantial complications in the 
estimation as the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the disturbance. Hence 
the models have been estimated using the GMM estimator developed for dynamic panel 
models by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator 
ensures efficiency and consistency, provided that the models are not subject to serial 
correlation of order two and that the instruments used are valid (which is checked using 
the Sargan test). 
Table 5 shows that, ceteris paribus, the effects of changes in the short term 
monetary policy rate on banks’ risk are positive. The overall quality of a loan portfolio 
indeed increases (banks’ EDFs decrease) if interest rates are lowered. This is consistent 
with the finding of Jiménez et al. (2009) that lower interest rates reduce the credit risk 
of outstanding loans and the predictions of Dubecq et al. (2009). The drop in the EDF is 17
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probably reinforced by the reduction in bank funding liquidity cost after the decrease in 
short-term monetary interest rates (Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2009a). 
The coefficient related to the TGAP variable is negative and significant, 
confirming the effect of a risk-taking channel: if the interest rate is below the 
benchmark rate, banks do take more risks. For example, taking the results from the 
baseline model in the first column, if the interest rate is 100 basis points below the value 
given by the Taylor rule, the average probability for a bank to go into default increases 
by 0.6 % after a quarter and by 0.8% in the long run. This is a very rough estimate of 
such a probability and - since the model does not include controls for asset price 
dynamics and individual bank-specific characteristics (to be discussed below) - it 
represents an upper limit of the effect. 
The coefficients for ΔGDPN are negative. Better economic conditions increase 
the number of projects becoming profitable in terms of expected net present value, 
thereby reducing the overall credit risk of the bank (Kashyap et al., 1993). Higher 
output growth reduces credit risk on both new and outstanding loans, in stark contrast to 
the differential effects of monetary policy. 
Furthermore, the coefficients for the slope of the yield curve are negative. A 
steeper yield curve determines an increase in bank profits (a decrease in the EDF) 
because of the typical maturity transformation function performed by banks, since their 
assets have a longer maturity than liabilities. This is consistent with the findings of 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009).  
Since the Taylor rule gap could, in principle, give different indications with 
respect to other measures, the reliability of these baseline results have been tested using 
the natural rate gap; that is, the difference between the real short-term interest rate and 
the natural interest rate (NRGAP). As shown in the second column of Table 5, results 
are very similar: the only difference is the magnitude of the coefficient for NRGAP, 
caused by the different average level of the two variables. As discussed at the beginning 
of this section, results are even more in favor of the existence of a risk-taking channel 
when using a simple Taylor rule with no interest rate smoothing and equal weights. 
Improvements in borrowers’ net worth and collateral are taken into account by 
introducing into the specification the evolution of asset prices:  18
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where ¨HP and ¨SM are the quarterly changes in housing and stock market returns, 
respectively. Both asset returns are demeaned and adjusted for inflation. The 
introduction of these variables accounts for the effects of the standard ‘financial 
accelerator’ mechanism, through which financing frictions on firms and households 
amplify or propagate exogenous disturbances (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). With a 
given bank risk aversion (or tolerance), the coefficients of both variables should be 
negative: a boost in asset prices increases the value of collateral and reduces overall 
credit risk. 
However, the results presented in the third column of Table 5 show that only the 
coefficients for changes in stock market returns have the expected negative sign, while 
the opposite is the case for housing prices. This calls for further investigation into the 
relationship between changes in housing prices and bank risk. 
Ellis (2008) points out that the recent credit crisis was triggered by credit losses 
on US mortgages. In the period under consideration, the United States seems to have 
built up a larger excess of housing supply, experienced a greater easing in mortgage 
lending standards, and ended up with a household sector that is more vulnerable to 
falling house prices. Some of these outcomes seem to have been driven by tax, legal and 
regulatory systems that encouraged households to increase their leverage and permitted 
banks to enable that development. Apart from the United States, there are other 
countries in the sample that experienced a boom-bust housing price cycle, namely 
Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (IMF, 2009b). Given this 
fact, we have included in the model (see below equation (3)) two interaction variables 
between each asset price and a dummy (HPBB) that takes the value of 1 if the bank is 
based in one of the countries that experienced a boom-bust housing cycle and zero 
elsewhere.  19
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The fourth column of Table 5 shows that the positive link between housing prices 
and trends in bank risk is accounted for by developments in the housing market of those 
countries that experienced a boom-bust cycle. The coefficient  j μ  for the remaining 
European countries, where the housing price bubble did not materialize (or was less 
pronounced), is indeed negative. 
The link between bank risk and accommodative monetary policy could also be 
influenced by balance sheet characteristics that summarize the ability and willingness of 
banks to supply additional loans (Ehrmann et al., 2003). We have, therefore, introduced 
into the specification SIZE  (the log of total assets; Kashyap and Stein, 1995), LIQ 
(securities and other liquid assets over total assets; Stein, 1998); and CAP (the capital-
to-asset ratio; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Van den Heuvel, 2002). The econometric 
model is therefore modified in the following way: 
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where all bank-specific characteristics refer to t-1 in order to avoid endogeneity bias.  
The results are reported in the fifth column of Table 5. The effects of liquidity 
(LIQ) and capitalization (CAP) on bank risk are negative. All other things being equal, 
liquid and well-capitalized banks are considered less risky by the market. The effect on 
size is contrary to the ‘too big to fail’ paradigm.  
During the recent credit crisis not all banks have been equally affected and 
responsible. The banks which were predominantly affected were large institutions 20
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which moved away from traditional retail banking activities towards a business model 
that principally relied on the creation, distribution and trading of new and complex 
securities (Panetta et al., 2009). Moreover, it has often been pointed out that these big 
banks in financial difficulties could have been “too big to be saved by their national 
governments alone” (Stiglitz, 2009). In order to check if the result on the size variable is 
driven by these effects during the crisis, the model has been adapted by including an 
interaction between the variable SIZE and a crisis dummy (CRISIS), which takes the 
value of 1 from 2007Q3 to 2008Q4 and zero elsewhere. 
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Interestingly, the log of total assets (SIZE) now has the expected negative impact 
on bank riskiness in the pre-crisis period, while the interaction with the dummy for the 
crisis period is positive and significant (see the sixth column of Table 5). The sign of 
the TGAP variable is still negative and significant, confirming the fact that if the interest 
rate is below the benchmark rate, banks do take more risks. In this more complete 
specification, however, if the short-term interest rate is 100 basis points below the rate 
given by the Taylor rule, the average probability for a bank to default increases by 0.4% 
after a quarter, which is significantly lower than the baseline estimation (0.6% in the 
first column of Table 5). 
Historically, most systemic banking crises have been preceded by periods of 
excessive lending growth (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; Borio and Drehmann, 2009). 
Therefore, it would be interesting to test whether the risk-taking channel continues to 
work at the level of individual banks, even when controlling for the effect on banking 
risk due to excessive lending, which is more systemic in nature. We have, therefore, 
computed a bank-specific measure for excessive credit expansion by subtracting from 
the individual bank lending growth at a given point in time the mean of the growth for 
all the other banks over that specific quarter. Since the impact of excessive credit 21
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The results reported in the last column of Table 5 show a U-shaped relationship 
between the deviation of lending growth from the mean value and bank risk. Banks that 
have a very low growth rate (that probably do not reach economies of scale), as well as 
those that have a high one (that may have a very aggressive price policy and supply a 
risky segment of the market), are considerably riskier than average (see Chart 3).
14 The 
sign of the TGAP variable, which monitors the risk-taking channel, remains negative 
and significant. The levels of the coefficients are predictably lower, because they 
capture only the part of the risk-taking channel that is dependent on non-traditional 
bank activities such as investment banking, securitization, derivatives and negotiation 
activity. The fact that a substantial part of the risk in bank balance sheets was not linked 
to traditional lending is amply documented (see, for instance, Shin, 2009).  
V. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
V.1 DIFFERENT MEASURES FOR BANK RISK 
The robustness of the results has been checked by considering a more complete term 
structure for bank risk. The reason for this test is that the one-year horizon for the EDF 
may not be sufficient to capture certain properties of risk that build up over a longer 
time frame. In order to address this, equation (1) was rerun using the EDF as a 
                                                           
13 See Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997).  
14 The result still holds if we consider a bank-specific measure for excessive lending lagged 4 quarters 
instead of one quarter under the hypothesis that the market needs at least one year to detect a significant 
deviation of the credit portfolio of a given bank with respect to the industry average (Jiménez and 
Saurina, 2006). Similar results are obtained using the loan to total asset ratio instead than the lending 
growth rate. Estimations are available from the authors upon request.  22
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dependent variable with horizons of both five and ten years. Unfortunately, these data 
have only been officially available since 2004, thereby reducing the number of 
observations in the sample. Despite this, the results presented in the second and third 
columns of Table 6 are consistent with those for the baseline model that uses the EDF 
over a one-year horizon (reported again for convenience in the first column of Table 6).  
It is worth noting that the increase of the EDF horizon does not change the sign 
and the significance of the coefficients attached to the monetary policy indicator (¨MP) 
or the Taylor Rule Gap (TGAP). It does, however, produce some effects on the absolute 
value of the β and γ coefficients. In particular, a drop in the monetary policy rate still 
reduces a bank’s EDF by lowering the credit risk on outstanding loans, although the 
magnitude of this effect is reduced for a longer-term horizon, probably because a 
substantial number of credit positions opened today will be closed at a future date. On 
the contrary, the strenght of the risk-taking channel increases because it probably takes 
some time for banks to adjust their portfolios towards a more risky composition. Very 
similar results are obtained using the natural interest rate gap or other specifications of 
the Taylor rule as measures of accommodative monetary policy. 
The second robustness test consists of calculating the impact of monetary policy 
on the idiosyncratic component of bank risk. In particular, it is necessary to test whether 
monetary policy influences an individual bank’s attitude toward risk, independently of 
the developments of the banking system as a whole, a common driver for all 
intermediaries. In other words, we recognize that the banking sector is a highly 
interlinked industry subject to systemic shocks, which could operate regardless of 
individual bank risk attitude. With this in mind, our goal is to capture only individual 
bank risk, independent of developments in the banking market as a whole. In order to 
tease out systemic risk and obtain the idiosyncratic component of bank risk, two 
approaches, based on stock market information, were used: first, a simple CAPM model; 
second, the approach used by Campbell et al. (2001), who separate stock market risk 
into broad index, industrial sector and idiosyncratic components (see Section III for 
more details). The results for the baseline equation (1), when the two alternative 
measures for idiosyncratic risk are used, are reported in columns IV and V of Table 6. 
The use of idiosyncratic measures for bank risk does not change the sign and the 
significance of the monetary policy indicator (¨MP) and the Taylor Rule Gap (TGAP). 23
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This confirms that bank risk-taking is not completely due to common factors emerging 
from the banking sector. 
The third robustness test is the use of spreads on the credit default swap as an 
alternative variable for bank risk positions. This measure, which accounts for the cost of 
buying credit risk insurance subject to a certain credit event (usually a default), has been 
widely used during the recent credit crisis as the barometer of financial health and an 
early indicator of banks’ problems (Blanco et al, 2005; Longstaff et al, 2005). Results 
for an unbalanced sample of more than 100 large banks over the period 2002-2009 
obtained from Bloomberg were also consistent with those obtained by using the EDF 
and idiosyncratic measure of banks risk. Results are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
The fourth robustness test was to use changes in bank ratings as a dependent 
variable, in order to see whether our results hold when these ratings are considered as a 
proxy for bank risk. This test is interesting because downgrades in ratings are sluggish 
and take a long time to occur. This, for example, seems to have been the case for the 
rating of securitized products during the recent credit crisis (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 
2009). The robustness test, therefore, used the banks’ standard long-term senior 
unsecured rating history and ratings outlook, calculated by Moody’s and available for a 
sub-sample of 149 banks, as a dependent variable in equation (1). In this case, the effect 
of the risk-taking channel is not strongly detected (i.e. the coefficients associated with 
ΔMP and the TGAP measure have the correct sign, but are no longer always 
significant). This could be due to the implementation of ratings downgrades, as 
observed during the Asian crisis (Ferri et al., 1999).  
V.2 TESTING FOR NON-LINEAR EFFECTS, BUSINESS EXPECTATIONS AND 
REGULATORY DIFFERENCES 
The recent crisis has reminded us of the fact that the manifestation of risk may be 
sudden and not linear. This section, therefore, provides a number of tests to verify 
whether the risk-taking channel is still in place when specific non-linear interactions 
between monetary policy and bank risk are taken into account. 
The first aspect to consider is that the effect of monetary policy on bank risk may 
be influenced not only by the TGAP but also by two other aspects: firstly, the nominal 
level of the interest rate; secondly, how many consecutive quarters the interest rate has 24
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been below the benchmark. The baseline equation has, therefore, been modified to 
include terms that represent the interaction between the TGAP variable and, 
respectively, the level of the interest rate (MP) and the number of consecutive quarters 
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The first column of Table 7 shows that the negative link between ΔEDF and 
TGAP is reinforced if the level of interest is particularly low (ψj>0), in line with the 
search for yield hypothesis. Financial intermediaries typically commit themselves to 
producing relatively high nominal rates of return in the long term. When interest rates 
become unusually low, independently of their relative distance with respect to the 
Taylor rule, the contractual returns can become more difficult to achieve and this can 
put pressure on banks to take on more risk in the hope of generating the return needed 
to remain profitable. Moreover, the coefficient ρj is negative, confirming that the effects 
of monetary policy on bank risk are amplified in the case of an extended period of low 
interest rate. To sum up, it is not only the size of the deviation of the interest rate with 
respect to a benchmark that matters but also the length of time this deviation persists. 
How can we be sure that what we are capturing are the effects of a risk-taking 
channel rather than heightened expectations of the economic conditions? Banks could 
indeed take on more risk simply because they anticipate better prospects rather than 
because interest rates are low. In order to control for this effect, we have included 
forward values of nominal growth in GDP, derived from Consensus Forecast Indicators 
(ΔGDPCF).
16 The results reported in the second column of Table 7 show that the effects 
on bank risk of a long period of low interest rates are still in place. 
These results could also be influenced by the distorting impact of the global level 
of risk aversion on the signals of bank risk. This does not seem to be the case as similar 
                                                           
15 The variables MP and BEL were also initially included in isolation in equation (7) but turned out not to 
be significant. Therefore we have decided to drop them from the model also taking into account the fact 
that MP is highly correlated with the variable SLOPE (see Table 1).  
16 We thank Steven Cecchetti for this useful suggestion. 25
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results are obtained when we also include into the specification the State Street Investor 
Confidence Index (SSICI), a measure of global investors’ attitude to risk (see the third 
column of Table 7). The variable SSICI controls for elements of structural irrationality 
or other behavioral attitudes on the side of investors, such as herding behavior (Barberis 
et al., 1998; Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004).
17  
The above results may also be influenced by differences in the intensity of bank 
supervision, which could have had an impact on the amount of risk undertaken (Beltratti 
and Stulz, 2009). In particular, it is necessary to verify whether more permissive 
legislation on bank activities could have led financial intermediaries to take more risks. 
Following the approach in Barth et al. (2004), a regulation variable (REG) was 
introduced into the baseline equation. This variable takes into account the extent to 
which banks may engage in securities, insurance and real estate activities. For the 
countries analyzed in this study, the variable REG takes a value from 5 to 12, where the 
latter value represents the maximum level of activity in which banks may engage. The 
results in the fourth column of Table 7 indicate a positive and significant value for this 
variable, supporting the idea that banks took more risk in those countries where specific 
institutional factors allowed them to be involved in more non-traditional banking 
activities. Also, in this case, the coefficients for the monetary policy indicator (¨MP), 
Taylor Rule Gap (TGAP), and their interactions with MP and BEL remain basically 
unchanged, pointing to the fact that the effects of long-standing low interest rates on 
bank risk are still at work. Very similar results are obtained replacing the variable REG 
with a complete set of country dummies to take into account other institutional 
characteristics. 
V.3 MODELING THE PROBABILITY OF BANKS BECOMING RISKY 
In this section, the probability of a bank becoming among the riskier institutions during 
the crisis period is modeled. In particular, those financial intermediaries that 
experienced the highest increase in their default probability after the 2007 summer are 
considered as risky. We have, therefore, created a binary variable (risky) that takes the 
                                                           
17 The State Street Investor Confidence Index focuses on expectations for future prices and returns and 
provides a quantitative measure of the actual and changing levels of risk contained in investment 
portfolios representing about 15% of the world's tradable assets. Further information is available at:  
http://www.statestreet.com/industry_insights/investor_confidence_index/ici_overview.html. 26
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value of 1 if the bank is in the top quartile of the distribution in terms of changes in the 
expected default probability in the period of financial crisis (2007Q2 – 2008Q4), and 0 
elsewhere. Starting from a sample of 588 banks, whose median increase in default 
probability during the crisis was 0.7%, banks considered as risky are those for which the 
increase was higher than 2.1% that delimit the last quarter of the distribution.  
The probability of a bank becoming risky during the crisis is considered as a 
function of a combination of factors that developed prior to the crisis. On the one hand, 
this probability is determined by macro factors, such as the health of the economy, the 
evolution of asset prices, the level of interest rates and the structure of the yield curve; 
on the other hand, it is affected by bank specific characteristics, such as size, liquidity, 
capitalization, the use of securitization instruments, lending activity. 
The baseline empirical model is given by the following probit equation: 
  [ ] ) ' ( 1 β X X risky P ik Φ = =   (8) 
where P is the probability, Φ is the standard cumulative normal probability distribution, 
X is a vector of regressors that include macro-variables of country k where bank i has its 
main seat and specific characteristics of the same bank i over the five years prior to the 
crisis (2002Q2 – 2007Q2). As usual, β parameters are estimated by maximum 
likelihood. 
Table 8 summarizes the results of the estimation. The pseudo-R
2 of the regression 
model, as in similar exercises, is not very high (14%) and reflects the fact that the Probit 
model only captures some of the underlying long-term causes of the financial turmoil 
and does not use any information from the crisis period. This means that the model 
neglects all those factors such as expectations of negative changes, difficulties in 
financial markets, liquidity interventions and, most importantly, bank idiosyncratic 
shocks that unfolded after the summer of 2007. 
Consistently with the risk-taking channel hypothesis, the coefficient for the BEL 
variable is positive and significant. This result confirms that if the interest rate is well 27
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below the benchmark rate for an overly extended period of time, banks do take more 
risks.
18  
The probit analysis aimed to take into consideration two additional factors, not 
analyzed so far, that could have influenced the evolution of bank risk prior to the crisis, 
namely, securitization activity and bank profitability. 
The trigger of the crisis was the subprime mortgage segment in the US that 
highlighted the limitations of the Originate-to-Distribute (OTD) model. This means that 
it is interesting to check if the effectiveness of the risk-taking channel still holds 
controlling for the fact that most of the banks in the sample have relied heavily on the 
securitization market and might have simply reduced monitoring and screening on their 
loan portfolios (Parlour and Plantin, 2007). Drucker and Puri (2007) show that 
securitized loans tend to be less informationally sensitive than loans held by banks, i.e. 
banks sell loans such as mortgages for which screening and monitoring are less 
important than for commercial and industrial loans. In the specification, we included, 
therefore, a bank-specific ratio of securitization activity to assess whether banks that 
were more active in the securitization market experienced a higher increase in their 
default probability during the crisis. The results show that banks that securitized 
increased their default probability during the period of crisis, even if this effect is only 
marginally significant. 
Profitability could have also played a role in bank risk-taking. It could be argued 
that certain banks which have done exceptionally well and achieved higher levels of 
profits prior to the crisis could be those who took the highest amounts of risk, for 
example, by expanding into segments of business with higher volatility of cash flows or 
by lowering their credit standards. Berger et al. (2000) and Goddard et al. (2004) find 
evidence that there is significant year-to-year persistence in the profitability of US and 
European banks. To control for the possible impact of performance on bank risk, we 
have also included the average return on assets (ROA) as a measure of profitability. 
Unlike the return on equity, the return on total assets is a measure of banks' profits 
                                                           
18 Similar results are obtained using a LOGIT model or a simple OLS where the dependent variable is 
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which does not include the influence on profits of leverage, which is already controlled 
by means of the capital-to-asset ratio. 
There is also a long established literature arguing that increases in competition 
could lead to greater (and possibly excessive) risk-taking by banks. This is because 
increased competition reduces the market power of banks, thereby decreasing their 
charter value. The decline in charter value, coupled with the existence of limited 
liability and the application of flat rate deposit insurance, could encourage banks to take 
on more risk (Matutes and Vives, 2000). To take this into account, we have used the 
responses from the Bank Lending Survey for euro area banks and Senior Loan Officer 
Survey for US banks regarding the effect of competition on credit conditions to 
construct a net percentage index (see Ciccarelli et al., 2010). This index, representing 
the difference between the number of banks that reported a tightening in credit 
conditions due to competition and the number that reported an easing, was used in the 
regression. The results indicate a positive link between the competition index (COMP) 
and risk-taking, but with no statistical significance. This result is in line with Boyd and 
De Niccoló (2005), who argue that the theoretical basis for linking more competition 
with increased incentives towards bank risk-taking is fragile.
19  
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The current credit crisis has drawn the attention of researchers and policy makers back 
to the link between monetary policy and bank risk-taking. Low short-term interest rates 
may influence banks’ perceptions of, and attitude towards, risk in at least two ways: (i) 
through their impact on valuations, incomes and cash flows which in turn can modify 
how banks measure risk; (ii) through a more intensive search for yield process, 
especially when nominal return targets are in place. These two ways may be amplified if 
agents perceive that monetary policy will be relaxed in the case of decreasing asset 
prices in a financial downturn (the so-called insurance effect) causing a classic moral 
hazard problem.  
The economic expansion that began in 2002 was characterized in many instances 
by the coexistence of low monetary policy rates, financial innovation and booming asset 
                                                           
19 See Carletti and Hartmann (2002) for a useful survey of the literature linking competition and stability.  29
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prices, three conditions that may have amplified the effectiveness of the risk-taking 
channel. 
We contribute to the debate and analyze the link between monetary policy and 
bank risk using a unique database of listed banks operating in 16 developed countries 
during and prior to the period of the financial crisis. We find that subdued short-term 
low interest rates over an extended period of time contributed to an increase in banks' 
risk. This insight is of interest to both monetary and supervisory authorities and has two 
main corollaries. First, it suggests that central banks would need to be aware of the 
possible effects of monetary policy actions on bank risk. The potential impact of risk-
taking by banks may have implications for longer term macroeconomic outlook 
including output growth, investment and credit. Second, banking supervisors should 
strengthened the macro-prudential perspective to financial stability by intensifying their 
vigilance during periods of protracted low interest rates, particularly if accompanied by 
other signs of risk-taking, such as rapid credit and asset price increases. 
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Table 3 
BALANCE SHEET CHARACTERISTICS AND BANK RISK PROFILE 
(1)
 
Distribution by bank 
risk (one year ahead 
EDF) 
Size            Liquidity  Capitalization   Lending 
 
(USD millions)  (% total assets)  (% total assets)  (Annual growth 
rate) 
        
High-risk banks 
(EDF=2.02%) (a)  20,405 21.3  8.9  13.5 
        
Low-risk banks 
(EDF=0.09%) (b)  94,746 26.0  10.9  11.3 
        
ǻ=(a)-(b) -74,341  -4.7  -2.0  2.2 
              
Note: (1) A low-risk bank has an average ratio of the EDF in the first quintile of the distribution by bank risk; a high-
risk bank an average EDF in the last quintile. Since the characteristics of each bank could change with time, percentiles 
have been calculated on mean values. 
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Table 4 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSIONS 
(1999Q1-2008Q4) 
 
Variable  Number of 




         
             
EDFt  19,796  0.61 0.17  1.9  0.01  29.98  0.08 0.43 
Δ EDFt  19,796  0.07 0.00  0.83  -28.0  27.0  -0.03 0.03 
ΔMP t  19,796  -0.08 0.00  0.56  -3.75  1.53  -0.27 0.34 
TGAP t  19,796  -0.44 -0.27  0.57 -3.6  1.37  -0.76 -0.07 
NRGAPt  19,796  -0.3 -0.21  1.41 -5.1  3.62  -1.1  0.63 
ΔGDPNt  19,796  1.09 1.15  0.96  -5.97  11.46  0.86 1.54 
SLOPEt  19,796  1.09 0.88  1.29  -2.25  3.69  -0.09 2.26 
ΔHPt  19,796  0.00 0.84  4.95  -22.98 79  -1.45 2.52 
ΔSMt  19,796  0.00 1.92  10.2  -47.63  63.72  -4.99 6.42 
SIZEt  19,796  7.15 6.55  2.25  -4.61  15.43  5.66 8.25 
LIQt  19,796  23.62 22.61  10.7 0.00  49.99  15.72 30.54 
CAPt  19,796  9.6 8.75  5.03  1.03  74.90  6.99  10.89 
EXLENDt  19,796  0.00 -0.62  7.8  -85.8  94.7  -3.35  2.64 
EXLENDt
2  19,796  60.00 9.12 290.2  0.00  8968.1  1.95 31.6 
BEL  19,796  8.99 10.00  6.00 0.00  20.00  3.00 14.00 
REG  19,796  10.32 11.00  1.85 4.00  12.00  10.00 11.00 
SSICI  19,796  114.70 114.2  11.77  83.10  134.33  107.05  122.12 
               
 
where:  
EDFt   =  expected default frequency (1 year ahead) 
ΔEDFt  =  change in the EDF (1 year ahead) 
ΔMPt   =   changes in the money market rate  
TGAPt  =   Taylor Rule gap   
NRGAPt  =   natural interest rate gap  
ΔGDPNt  =  changes in nominal GDP  
SLOPEt =   changes in the slope of the yield curve 
ΔHPt   =  quarterly changes in the housing price index (demeaned) 
ΔSMt   =  quarterly changes in stock market returns (demeaned) 
SIZEt  =  log of total assets (USD millions) 
LIQt   =  liquidity-to-total assets *100 
CAPt   =  capital-to-total asset ratio *100 
EXLENDt  =   excessive credit expansion (demeaned) 
EXLENDt
2 =  square term of excessive credit expansion (demeaned) 
BEL   =  number of consecutive quarters with interest rate below the benchmark 
REG   =  regulatory index  
SSICI =  State Street Investor Confidence Index 
 34
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Table 7 
TESTING FOR NON-LINEAR EFFECTS, BUSINESS EXPECTATIONS AND 
DIFFERENCES IN REGULATION 
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
ΔEDFt-1 0.203 *** 0.007 0.242 *** 0.008 0.244 *** 0.007 0.240 *** 0.007
ΔMP  t 0.070 0.068 0.262 *** 0.052 0.263 *** 0.057 0.241 *** 0.052
ΔMP t-1 0.226 *** 0.054 0.125 *** 0.040 0.120 *** 0.044 0.142 *** 0.042
TGAP t -0.167 ** 0.080 -0.322 *** 0.056 -0.318 *** 0.057 -0.146 ** 0.058
TGAP t-1 -0.057 * 0.030 -0.093 0.057 -0.065 * 0.037 -0.213 *** 0.078
ΔGDPNt -0.017 ** 0.008
ΔGDPNt-1 -0.114 *** 0.008
SLOPEt -0.043 * 0.025 -0.025 0.019 -0.031 * 0.018 -0.016 0.017
SLOPEt-1 -0.081 *** 0.022 -0.042 *** 0.016 -0.042 *** 0.016 -0.080 *** 0.017
TGAPt*MPt 0.134 *** 0.017 0.025 ** 0.011 0.025 ** 0.011 0.011 0.011
TGAPt-1*MPt-1 0.024 * 0.014 0.020 * 0.012 0.020 * 0.012 0.050 *** 0.012
TGAPt*BELt -0.015 *** 0.001 -0.005 *** 0.001 -0.005 *** 0.001 -0.009 *** 0.001
TGAPt-1*BELt-1 -0.045 *** 0.002 -0.013 *** 0.002 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.003 * 0.001
ΔGDPNCF t -0.073 *** 0.008 -0.063 *** 0.008 -0.111 *** 0.008
ΔGDPNCFt+1 -0.011 * 0.006 -0.010 * 0.006 0.004 0.006
SSICI t 0.002 * 0.001
REG t 0.119 *** 0.014
Sample period
No of banks, No of observations 643 19,796 643 19,796 643 19,796 643 19,796
Sargan test (2nd step; pvalue) 0.687 0.825 0.333 0.261
MA(1), MA(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.849 0.000 0.871 0.000 0.863 0.000 0.928
1999 Q1 - 2008 Q4 1999 Q1 - 2008 Q4 1999 Q1 - 2008 Q4
Notes: Robust standard errors. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
The coefficients for the seasonal dummies are not reported.In the GMM estimation, instruments are the second and further 
lags of the dependent variable, the macro-variables and of the bank-specific characteristics included in each equation. 
(I)                 
Controlling for 
nominal level of 
interest rates and 
extended period of 
low interest rates
(III)                
Controlling for 
changes in risk 
appetite (State Street 
Investor Confidence 
Index)
1999 Q1 - 2008 Q4
Dependent variable: quarterly 
change of the expected default 
frequency (EDF) over a 1 year 
horizon 
Controlling for 




regulation (Barth et 
al., 2004)
(II)                  (IV)               
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Table 8 
MODELLING THE PROBABILITY FOR A BANK TO BECOME RISKY
Coef. Sig Robust 
Std. Err.
Coef. Sig Coef. Sig
BEL 0.285 *** 0.091 0.288 *** 0.094 0.321 *** 0.108
ΔGDPN -1.178 ** 0.575 -1.185 ** 0.589 -1.541 ** 0.763
SLOPE -1.277 ** 0.517 -1.317 ** 0.531 -1.726 ** 0.748
ΔHP 0.836 *** 0.209 0.899 *** 0.217 1.239 *** 0.458
ΔSM 0.758 *** 0.274 0.803 *** 0.283 0.879 *** 0.309
EDF 0.276 *** 0.101 0.256 ** 0.114 0.269 ** 0.116
SIZE -0.023 0.038 0.001 0.040 0.004 0.040
LIQ -0.012 ** 0.005 -0.013 ** 0.005 -0.013 ** 0.005
CAP -0.046 *** 0.017 -0.033 * 0.018 -0.034 * 0.018
SEC 0.198 * 0.113 0.196 * 0.111 0.204 * 0.115
EXLEND 0.146 *** 0.025 0.157 *** 0.026 0.158 *** 0.026
REG 0.064 0.103 0.088 0.105 0.056 0.109
ROA -0.270 ** 0.126 -0.279 ** 0.127
COMP 0.041 0.046











(I)                            
Baseline equation
(II)                            
Bank profit
(III)                           
Competition effect 
The equation models the probability for a bank i with head office in country k to become risky during the crisis (to be in the last 
quartile of the distribution). All explanatory variable except BEL are expressed as average values over the period 2002 Q2- 2007 Q2. 
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Chart 1
EXPECTED DEFAULT FREQUENCY OF BANKS 
































Source: Moody’s KMV.  
Chart 2





















a) Difference between the short-term interest rate and that implied by a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing (1)
c) Difference between the real short-term interest rate and the natural rate
 
b) Difference between the short-term interest rate and that implied by a standard Taylor rule (2)
   
Source: Authors’ calculation.  
Notes: The Taylor rule is given by the formula it=(1-γ) [α+βπ (πt - π
∗)+ βy (yt - yt
∗)] + γ i
rate α is calculated by means of a Hodrick and Prescott filter. (1)  βπ=1.5; βy =0.5; γ=0.85; (2) βπ=0.5; βy =0.5; 
γ=0. 
 
t-1, where the natural 39
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Chart 3
EXCESSIVE LENDING EXPANSION AND BANK RISK 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. The variable EXLEND represents excessive credit expansion (demeaned).  40
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